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Abstract
In this paper we construct and analyze a growth model with the following three in-
gredients. (i) Technological progress is embodied. (ii) The production function of a
ﬁrm is such that the ﬁrm makes both technology upgrade as well as capital and la-
bor decisions. (iii) The ﬁrm’s production technology is putty-clay. We assume that
there are disincentives to the accumulation of capital, resulting in a divergence be-
tween the social and the private cost of investment. We solve a single ﬁrm’s problem
in this environment. Then we determine general equilibrium prices of capital goods
of diﬀerent vintages. Using these prices we aggregate ﬁrms’ decisions and construct
the theoretical analogues of National Income statistics. This generates a relationship
between disincentives and per capita incomes. We analyze this relationship and show
the quantitative and qualitative roles of embodiment and putty-clay. We also show how
the model is taken to data, quantiﬁed and used to determine to what extent income
gaps across countries can be attributed to disincentives.
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11 Introduction
It has long been suggested that distortions aﬀect capital accumulation and can create sig-
niﬁcant per capita income diﬀerences across countries. This suggestion is based on growth
theory, which emphasizes capital accumulation as the source of riches and, by implication,
considers distortions to capital accumulation as one cause for poverty. While this general idea
is hardly disputable, it brings up several, more detailed, questions. Among those questions
are: To what extent is a model of economic growth into which distortions are incorporated
quantitatively consistent with this view? Does the answer depend on whether technological
progress is embodied or disembodied? Does it depend on whether the technology is putty-
clay or putty-putty? What are the important parameters on which the answers to these
questions hinge? Are there any other observables that can corroborate the theory? This
paper develops a theory to address these questions and suggests ways of implementing the
theory.
More speciﬁcally, we construct and analyze a model of technological progress and eco-
nomic growth. The model contains the following three ingredients. A. Technological progress
is embodied, i.e., new capital embodying the new technology has to be installed in order for
technological progress to take eﬀect. B. The production function of a ﬁrm is such that the
ﬁrm makes both technology upgrade as well as capital and labor decisions - there is both
a qualitative and a quantitative margin. C. Once a ﬁrm determines its capital-labor ratio
for a new technology it cannot change it until its next technological upgrade, the so called
putty-clay assumption. Analysis of this model and comparison to alternative models (that
exclude one or more of these three ingredients) shows that per capita income is more sensi-
tive to distortions in our model than in alternative models. The analysis also yields several
implications that describe how certain observables are expected to behave over time and how
they are expected to compare across countries. Some of these implications are as follows.
The ﬁrst implication is that capital goods are eventually scrapped and replaced by new
capital goods that reﬂect better technology. How long capital is held for is endogenous and
depends on the price of capital, which reﬂects distortions. The more distorted the economy,
the longer is capital held for, the more antiquated it is (on average), and the lower is its
average quality. Hence distortions in our model aﬀect not only the quantity of capital that
a country accumulates but also the age structure of capital and hence its average quality.
2Mirroring this, the second implication relates to the price proﬁle of capital goods, i.e., the
function that relates the vintage of a capital good to its price on second hand markets.1 If one
considers two diﬀerent countries that have two diﬀerent distortion levels, i.e., face diﬀerent
prices for new vintage capital, then their price proﬁles are diﬀerent. The more distorted
economy has a higher price proﬁle and the price of capital in it declines more slowly (over a
certain range). The implication therefore is that the price of capital on second hand markets
is higher (for any given vintage) and that the price of capital goods declines more slowly
as they age. This appears consistent with casual empiricism. Capital goods that have long
been scrapped in rich (less distorted) economies and command therefore zero price are still
in usage in poor economies and command a positive price.
The third implication of the theory is that wage rates are not equal to the marginal
p r o d u c to fl a b o r . I n s t e a dt h ew a g er a t ee q u a l st h eo u t p u to ft h em o s ta n t i q u a t e dp l a n t
in the economy. As a consequence, workers working in the same type of establishment,
say McDonald’s, and operating the same equipment and structures earn much less in poor
countries than in rich countries. Furthermore, wages decline faster with distortions in our
model than in the neoclassical model (i.e., the model with disembodied technological progress
and putty-putty technology).
The fourth implication is that investment at the level of the individual plant is lumpy,
while investment at the level of the economy is smooth. This is consistent with empirical
ﬁndings by Doms and Dunne (1998).
Our model is constructed with a view towards how it maybe quantiﬁed and applied to
development issues. Motivated by this goal we specify a parametric family of aggregate pro-
duction functions, the C.E.S. family. Then we derive an equilibrium and show how it relates
to parameters of this family. This relationship allows us to recover the values of parame-
ters of the aggregate production function from values of parameters that are estimable from
data. Once we insert these estimated values (that we estimate elsewhere) into a production
function, we simulate the model and show how per capita incomes depend on distortions
over a reasonable range of parameter values (where “reasonable” means it is consistent with
the Summers Heston data set). As it turns out per capita incomes are quite sensitive to
distortions in our simulated model and are more so than in models that rely on a diﬀerent
1To facilitate cross country comparisons, we normalize this proﬁle, i.e., divide the price of each vintage
by the price of the new vintage.
3production function. Hence one contribution of the paper is to highlight the role of the ag-
gregate production function in explaining income gaps and propose an empirically workable
framework in which this role can be studied.
Going beyond the particular model we analyze here we show the role of embodied versus
disembodied technological progress, the role of putty-clay versus putty-putty technology,
and the interplay between them. Each combination of these modeling choices generates a
diﬀerent model and diﬀerent predictions (sometimes qualitative and sometimes quantitative)
regarding how distortions aﬀect per capita income. In this paper we work out the details
of the embodied/putty-clay model and develop a methodology to show how it compares to
other models. In a companion paper we apply this methodology to actual data, perform
quantitative exercises, and assess the embodied/putty-clay model’s predictions.
Although there is a fairly extensive literature that uses growth theory to assess to what
extent distortions aﬀect per capita incomes, the paper that pioneered the modeling approach
we pursue here is Jovanovic and Rob (1997). The main diﬀerence is that we consider a more
general theory in which the ﬁrm decides both the quantity and the quality of capital, which,
as explained above, brings the model closer to data. In addition, we derive the general
equilibrium price proﬁle of capital goods which again brings us closer to data (because
one is able to assess the relevance of the model by studying the behavior of capital good
prices on second hand markets). Also, once we have a price proﬁle we generate a theoretical
counterpart to the concept of “capital at market prices,” which is analogous to the way NIPA
evaluates and aggregates capital stocks. We supply a more detailed and more comprehensive
comparison to previous literature in the body of the paper.
The plan of the paper is as follows. The next subsection provides a verbal description
of the model. Section 2 sets up the model and the maximization program of an individual
ﬁrm. Section 3 provides the solution to the ﬁrm’s program. Section 4 provides comparative
statics properties of this solution. Section 5 treats general equilibrium aspects of the model,
including the determination of wages, rental rates of capital and the price proﬁle of capital
goods. Section 6 uses this information to derive the theoretical counterparts of national
income statistics and show their comparative statics properties. Section 7 provides a detailed
discussion of how our model relates to alternative models of technological progress and to
previous literature. An Appendix contains all technical details.
41.1 Verbal description of the Model and its Mechanics
The unit of analysis in the model is the individual ﬁrm. The production function of a ﬁrm
depends on labor, capital and the vintage of this capital. A ﬁrm faces exogenous techno-
logical progress and has to decide when to adopt new technology. The eﬀect of adopting
a new technology is that it raises the eﬃciency (or productivity) of workers. When a new
technology is adopted, however, a ﬁrm’s pre-existing capital stock (which reﬂects the ﬁrm’s
old technology) is rendered useless. If the ﬁrm wants its workers to work with a positive
quantity of capital, it must buy capital that reﬂects the new technology, new vintage capital.
Therefore, a ﬁrm’s decision is twofold: it chooses when to adopt a new technology and how
much capital of the new vintage to install.
The economy is populated by a continuum of identical ﬁrms, which upgrade their technol-
ogy in sequence. As a result of these sequential upgrading decisions the economy has, at any
moment in time, a window of capital goods of diﬀerent vintages. The width of this window
corresponds to the holding period of capital and the height of the window corresponds to
how much capital is being installed. In addition, at any moment in time one has a general
equilibrium price proﬁle of capital goods, i.e., a function relating the vintage of a capital
good to its price. We determine how the window and prices of capital goods are aﬀected by
distortions and other parameters. Once we determine these eﬀects, we determine the eﬀect
of distortions on various national income statistics. In particular, we determine the eﬀect of
distortions on per capita income, the investment-capital ratio, the investment-output ratio,
and wage rates.
2 The Model
We consider an inﬁnite horizon, one good economy. Time is continuous and indexed by
t ∈ [0,∞).
Agents and goods. The economy is populated by a continuum of identical, inﬁnitely
lived individuals. Each individual buys output (in her capacity as a consumer) and sells
labor (in her capacity as a worker). The population of individuals at date 0 is of measure 1
and it grows at the rate n. Thus population at date t is of measure
N(t)=e
nt.
5There is a continuum of identical, inﬁnitely lived ﬁrms. Each ﬁrm hires workers, buys
capital, operates a constant returns to scale production function, and sells output. Individ-
uals and ﬁrms take prices as given. Since production exhibits constant returns to scale and
since ﬁrms are price takers, the equilibrium proﬁto fe a c hﬁrm is zero and the size of ﬁrms is
indeterminate. For convenience and without loss of generality we normalize the size of ﬁrms
so that each ﬁrm employs one worker.
There is one output in the economy, which is used both for consumption and investment.
The technical rate of transformation between consumption and investment is constant and
normalized to one.
Technological progress, vintage capital and embodiment. As time progresses
better technology becomes (exogenously) available. Technologies are indexed by their vintage
so that vintage s technology is a technology that becomes available at date s. Technological
progress is labor augmenting, i.e., it makes workers more productive. More speciﬁcally a
worker using vintage s technology delivers A(s) eﬃciency units of labor, where
A(s)=e
gs.
g is called the rate of technological progress.
Capital goods are also indexed by vintage and vintage s capital is capital that embodies
vintage s technology. Capital of an earlier vintage cannot be used - either by itself or in
combination with vintage s capital - to operate vintage s technology. Therefore if a ﬁrm is
to use capital with a new technology, new capital goods that embody the new technology
must be put in place.2
Production in a single ﬁrm at a given point in time. Consider a point in time,
say t.A t t a ﬁrm is characterized by its most recently adopted technology, say s (s ≤ t),
2The ﬁrm has the option of adopting new technology, enjoying the increase in eﬃciency units of labor
that it delivers, but not using any capital with the new technology. In this case the ﬁrm foregoes the
beneﬁt of combining labor with capital goods. Whether this option is proﬁtable depends on properties of
the production function and in particular on whether the marginal productivity of capital is ﬁnite or inﬁnite
at K =0 .
On the other hand, if the ﬁrm chooses to use capital with the new technology, it must use new vintage
capital that is “customized” to the new technology. This is the sense in which technological progress is
embodied.
6and its vintage s capital input, K. We refer to such ﬁrm as an (s,K) ﬁrm. At t =0 ,aﬁrm
starts from some initial condition (s0,K 0),w i t hK0 ≥ 0 ≥ s0.
An (s,K) ﬁrm produces output according to a C.E.S. production function. Namely, the
date t output ﬂow of such ﬁrm is
Y (s,t)=e
−δ(t−s)A(s)f (k), (1)




is capital per eﬃciency unit of labor,
f(k) ≡
³





is the C.E.S. production function and 0 ≤ α < 1 is the distribution parameter.4
Upgrading. Consider a point in time, say s,a tw h i c haﬁrm upgrades its technology. At
that point the ﬁrm also chooses how much capital K of vintage s to install and how many
workers to employ (which we normalize to one). Once the ﬁrm makes that determination it is
committed to the vintage s technology and to the capital and labor inputs it had pre-selected
- until its next technological upgrade. Therefore, a ﬁrm has full ﬂexibility ex-ante and full
rigidity ex-post. This is commonly referred to as the putty-clay formulation.5 Between
upgrades the ﬁrm makes no economic decisions; it merely collects the output ﬂow speciﬁed
by (1), and pays wages.
The private cost of installing capital of a new vintage is p (units of the consumption
g o o d )p e r - u n i tc a p i t a l .T h u s ,i faﬁrm upgrades at date s and installs K units of vintage s
capital, it pays pK. pK is paid up front (at s)a n dp is independent of s.
3Note that depreciation aﬀects output, not capital. We do this for tractability and ease of exposition. In
our companion, applications paper we consider also the case in which depreciation aﬀects capital.
4In this section we only consider an individual ﬁrm. Later when we consider many ﬁr m sw ea s s u m et h a t
the values of the above parameters (α, σ etc.) are the same for all ﬁrms. The only diﬀerence between ﬁrms is
that they adopt new technologies at diﬀerent points in time and hence install diﬀerent quantities of capital.
5Although the model and analysis here is conﬁned to the putty-clay case, we provide a full ﬂedged
comparison between models of putty-putty and putty-clay in Section 7.
7When a ﬁrm buys new capital goods it scraps its old capital goods. Old capital goods
cannot be converted back into output or into capital goods of a newer vintage (and, as
mentioned earlier, the production function is such that it is not possible to combine old and
new capital goods). We further assume that the scrap value of capital goods is zero. Later
we introduce second hand markets explicitly and show that the market value of scrapped
capital is in fact zero. In doing so we “endogenize” the assumption that the ﬁrm gets zero
for capital it scraps.6
The ﬁrm’s maximization problem.T h eo b j e c t i v eo faﬁrm is to maximize the dis-
counted value of revenues net of wages and capital installation costs. Discounting is with
respect to the constant, instantaneous interest rate r,w h i c ht h eﬁr mt a k e sa sg i v e n .W ea s -
sume that r>g , which is necessary to ensure boundedness of the ﬁrm’s objective function.
T h ee c o n o m i cd e c i s i o nf a c i n gaﬁrm at a given point in time, say t, is as follows. The
ﬁrm operates with a certain combination (s,K). Then it has to decide on its next upgrade
date, say s + T, and the quantity of vintage s + T capital K to install at s + T.
The tradeoﬀ governing these decisions is as follows. The capital stock the ﬁrm has on
its hands is already paid for so it “comes for free.” On the other hand, as time goes on the
technological frontier keeps moving out so this capital becomes more and more obsolete. On
top of that, the ﬁrm had pre-committed itself to employ one worker whose equilibrium wage
keeps increasing (see below).7 Therefore, a point comes where operating an old technology
is no longer proﬁtable, i.e., it pays to upgrade to a new technology.
Considering output used for consumption as the numeraire, the dynamic programming
formulation of the ﬁrm’s problem is as follows





−r(τ−t)[Y (s,τ) − w(τ)]dτ
+e
−r(s+T−t) [V (s + T,K




6Another way of saying this is that the introduction of second hand markets has no eﬀect on the ﬁrm’s
upgrading decision. This is because the equilibrium prices in these markets are such that whatever is optimal
without second hand markets is still optimal given the equilibrium prices in second hand markets. The reason
for explicitly introducing second hand markets anyway is to establish a correspondence between the stock of
capital as it is measured by NIPA and an analogous concept of the theory.
7Obviously, the cost of employing workers is lessened if labor is divisible and perfectly mobile, the putty-
putty case. Nonetheless, even if labor is perfectly mobile, scrapping and upgrading still occur as long as
σ < 1.
8where w(τ) i st h ew a g er a t ea td a t eτ.T h eﬁrm takes p,r,a n dw(·) as given. As a matter
of terminology we refer to T as the lifespan of capital and to the time interval of length
T b e t w e e nu p g r a d e sa sareplacement cycle.
Distortions. As stated earlier, the social technical rate of transformation between con-
sumption and investment is one. Nonetheless, a ﬁrm privately pays p per unit capital. The
reason is that there are taxes (or other distortions) on the installment of capital, which equal
p−1. The analysis applies also when p<1, i.e., when capital is subsidized. With appropri-
ate changes, p can alternatively be interpreted as the technical rate at which consumption
goods are transformed into investment goods. However, in discussing our results we conﬁne
attention to the case where p − 1 is interpreted as distortions.8
3 Solution to the Firm’s Maximization Problem
We derive now a solution to the ﬁrm’s problem assuming that the ﬁrm faces wages that grow
at the rate g, w(t)=w0egt,w h e r ew0 is determined below. The appendix shows, under this
assumption, that a solution to the ﬁrm’s problem exists and that it is unique. Furthermore,
it shows that the lifespan of capital is equal across upgrades (starting with the ﬁrst upgrade
and onwards and excluding the lifespan of the ﬁrm’s initial capital) and that the solution is
“balanced,” i.e., that capital, output and proﬁts all grow at the rate g. In this section we
exploit these properties and characterize the solution to the ﬁrm’s problem by manipulating
ﬁrst order conditions. In doing so we assume an interior solution, i.e., 0 <K ,T<∞.O u r
derivations here are heuristic and are spelled out because they clarify the mechanics of the
model and because the results are used repeatedly in what follows. The formal analysis is
fully worked out in the Appendix.
Assume the ﬁrm last upgraded at s and that its next upgrade is scheduled for s + T.
Then diﬀerentiating the objective (2) with respect to K and using the envelope theorem we
get the following FOC for K
p = D(r + δ,T)f
0 (k), (3)
8This interpretation is consistent with Jones (1994) paper. Recently, Hsieh and Klenow (2003) argue
that income gaps are due to low productivity of the investment sector in poor countries (as opposed to
distortions). Our analysis can also be interpreted from this point of view. In particular our analysis can be
viewed as quantifying the extent to which income gaps come from the diﬀerential eﬃciency of the investment
sector.
9where











and K(s + T) is the optimal quantity of capital installed at s + T.
This condition is the usual equality between the unit cost of capital p and the return
it generates, i.e., the discounted value of marginal products over the lifespan of installed
capital.







V = g (
·
V being the total derivative of V (t,K,t) with respect to t).
This gives
Y (s,s + T) − w(s + T) − (r − g)[V (s + T,K(s + T),s+ T) − pK(s + T)] = 0. (4)
This condition equates the cost of postponing a technological upgrade, which is the loss of
higher output, to the beneﬁt, which is that technology improves in the interim and that the
cost of installing new capital goods is delayed.
We eliminate V from (4) as follows. Let π be the discounted proﬁt - in terms s + T
dollars - within the time interval t ∈ (s + T,s+ T + T]. Since the solution is balanced
V (s + T,K(s + T),s+ T) − pK(s + T)=
π
1 − e−(r−g)T , (5)
where
π = D(r + δ,T)Y (s + T,s+ T) − D(r − g,T)w(s + T) − pK(s + T).
Using balancedness again this simpliﬁes to
π = e
gT [D(r + δ,T)Y (s,s) − D(r − g,T)w(s) − pK(s)]. (6)




[D(r + δ,T)Y (s,s) − pK(s)] = 0. (7)
10Combining the FOC for T with the FOC for k, i.e., substituting (1) into (7), the FOC
for T boils down to
£




(3) and (8) are the FOC’s to the ﬁrm’s problem. There is an alternative and sometimes more
convenient way of expressing them. Let
u ≡ e
−gT.
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A shorter, albeit less explicit, derivation of these conditions is as follows. We assume the
ﬁrm has zero capital at t =0and impose the requirement that k and u are the same for all





a+b f(k) − pk
1 − ua−1 . (10)
Diﬀerentiating F(k,u) with respect to k and u,w eg e tt h es a m eF O C ’ s ,( 9 ) .T h eA p p e n d i x
shows that the second order conditions corresponding to the maximization of (10) are satisﬁed
if and only if







1 − ua. (12)
The appendix also shows that (11) holds for any 0 ≤ σ ≤ 2. Finally it shows that (9) admits
one and only one (u,k) solution.
These derivations are valid only if the ﬁrm’s objective is bounded and the solution is
11interior. Since the ﬁrm operates with a constant returns to scale production function and is
a price taker, these requirements are satisﬁed if and only if the maximized value of the ﬁrm’s
objective is zero. And this, in turn, is satisﬁed if and only if the discounted value within




where T and k take on the values that solve (9). This pins down the value of w0.T h en e t
result is stated as follows.








or that 1 < σ < 2 and p>P(σ).T h e n :
(i) Starting with the ﬁrst upgrade, the optimal lifespans of capital are uniquely determined,
are equal across upgrades, are strictly positive and ﬁnite. The optimal lifespan T is found
from the solution to (9).
(ii) Consider a date s at which the ﬁrm upgrades. Then the optimal amount of capital it
installs K(s) is given by
K (s)=A(s)k, (15)
k being the solution to (9).
(iii) The lifespan of the capital that the ﬁrm has on its hands initially depends of its
vintage and on its quantity. The younger is the vintage and/or the larger is the quantity of
capital the longer is this lifespan.
In addition to the restrictions we have already discussed, two further restrictions underlie
Proposition 1. The ﬁrst restriction relates to the price of capital. If σ < 1 and p ≥ P(σ),
capital is so expensive in relation to its marginal product that the ﬁrm never upgrades the
technology. This can be veriﬁed from equation (3), which shows that if p ≥ P(σ) and if
capital that is installed is held forever, the price of capital is higher than the discounted
9If the initial wage w(0) = f(k)e−(g+δ)T were lower, the ﬁrm’s objective would be unbounded. If w(0)
were higher the ﬁrm would never upgrade.
12value of the marginal products that it generates. If that is the case we get a corner solution,
i.e., the ﬁrm never upgrades its technology and its output converges to zero in the long run.
For this reason, and as a matter of terminology, we refer to P(σ) as a poverty trap.A tt h e
other extreme, If σ > 1 and p ≤ P(σ), capital is so inexpensive in relation to its marginal
product that the ﬁrm installs inﬁnite quantity of capital and the value of its objective is also
inﬁnite (this again can be veriﬁed from equation (3)). Altogether the restriction on the price
of capital ensures that the solution is interior, not corner.
The second restriction is that the elasticity of substitution is between 0 and 2. When the
elasticity of substitution is above 2 a qualitatively diﬀerent solution may arise. In particular
the ﬁrm may choose to upgrade at each instant but install zero capital. Under such upgrade
policy the ﬁrm’s output grows without having to install (and pay for) new capital. Hence
this situation resembles what happens under disembodied technological progress, and is dealt
with in a separate paper.
4 Comparative Statics of the Firm’s Optimum
In this section we determine how T and K vary with p, i.e., how distortions aﬀect the lifespan
and the quantity of installed capital. We determine these eﬀects by implicit diﬀerentiation







h(u,a − 1) − h(u,a + b)
h(u,a − 1)
h(u,a + b)
1+b − [h(u,a − 1) − h(u,a + b)]
1+b













σ − [h(u,a − 1) − h(u,a + b)]
, (17)
where h is given by (12). Invoking the second order condition (11), the fact that h is positive,












for 1 < σ ≤ 2. Thus the lifespan of capital may either increase or decrease (as p increases),
depending on the elasticity of substitution σ.
This last result, (19), is somewhat surprising. A more natural conjecture is that the
lifespan of capital is lengthened as p increases, so as to spread the cost of capital over a
longer time and oﬀs e tt h ei n c r e a s ei np. There is a second force at work however. When
σ > 1, capital and labor are substitutes. Therefore, if p increases the ﬁrm uses less capital
(as per (18)) and because capital and labor are substitutes it uses more labor. But the way
to use more labor is to upgrade more frequently. Then labor works with technology that is
closer (on average) to the frontier and therefore delivers more eﬃciency units. (By contrast,
if σ < 1 capital and labor are complements. Therefore, if p increases the ﬁrm uses less capital
a n dl e s sl a b o r ,w h i c hi te ﬀects by upgrading less frequently)
5 General Equilibrium
To this point we analyzed the problem of a single, price taking ﬁrm. In this section we
consider a continuum of such ﬁrms and a continuum of consumers. The competitive interac-
tion between these agents determines equilibrium prices. It also determines the mechanics
of consumption and investment over time and across ﬁrms. To determine these endogenous
variables, we start out by analyzing the household sector.
5.1 The household sector
Consider the problem facing an individual in her capacity as a consumer. Population growth
is incorporated into this problem by assuming that each individual is part of a family that
grows at the rate n and that each individual maximizes the lifetime utility of her family
subject to the family’s lifetime budget constraint. The ﬂow utility function of each family
14member is c1−γ
1−γ ,w h e r ec is ﬂow consumption and γ is an elasticity parameter. The rate of
time preference is constant and denoted by ρ. The lifetime utility of a representative family








The family has some initial wealth, call it ω, which comes from owning equity shares in
ﬁrms. On top of that wealth, each member of the family receives a stream of wages w(·).









where x(t) are the date t proceeds from the taxation of capital.
To ensure that a (ﬁnite) solution to the household problem exists we assume that
ρ > (1 − γ)g + n. (21)
This assumption together with equation (28) ensures that
r>n+ g,
so that each family’s wealth is ﬁnite and so that each ﬁrm’s objective is bounded. Under




where c0 is such that the family’s budget constraint is satisﬁed.
155.2 The relationship between rental rates and the prices of capital
goods
Consider the capital stock held by some ﬁrm and assume it is of vintage s. Then this capital
delivers a ﬂow of rental rates which equals the output ﬂow (generated by this capital and
the one worker that operates it) minus wages. The discounted value of these rental rates is
the shadow price of this capital in the second hand market10 or, equivalently, the shadow
equity value of the ﬁrm holding this capital stock.11 Let R(s,τ) be the date-τ rental rate of
one unit of vintage-s capital (for s ≤ τ ≤ s+T)a n dl e tr be the instantaneous interest rate.






Rental rates adjust in equilibrium so that
p(s,s)=p for all s.
Note that we deﬁne the rental rate of capital as residual earnings, i.e., as output minus wages.
If wages were equal to the marginal productivity of labor the rental rate would equal the
marginal productivity of capital (because the production function exhibits constant returns
to scale). However, as we show later, the equilibrium in our model is such that wages and
rental rates are not equal to the corresponding marginal productivity.
5.3 The staggering of ﬁrms in the economy
To focus on a balanced growth path we assume that ﬁrms are initially (at t =0 ) staggered
across vintages, so their upgrading decisions come in sequence. Let M(s,0) be the density
10Since all ﬁrms are identical there are no gains from trading capital across ﬁrms. Consequently, “shadow
price” is understood as the price that makes the net demand for capital equal to zero.
11The price of a share is understood as its shadow price since in our economy we don’t need a separate
equity market to decentralize feasible allocations.
16of vintage s ﬁrms at date 0 and assume
M(s,0) =
(
mens −T ≤ s ≤ 0
0 s<−T or s>0
, (24)
for some m. Since the labor force at date 0 is of measure 1 and since it is fully employed, m




Solving for m we get
m =
n
1 − e−nT . (25)
The quantity of capital held by a vintage s ﬁrm, for −T ≤ s ≤ 0,i sK(s)=kegs,w h e r ek is
the solution of (9). This pins down the economy’s initial conditions.
Given the initial density (24), given that ﬁrms upgrade in sequence every T periods, and
given the zero proﬁt condition (which, together with the one ﬁrm/one worker convention,
means that new ﬁrms come into existence to “create jobs” for newborns), (24) extends to
all t ≥ 0, i.e.,
M(s,t)=
(
mens t − T ≤ s ≤ t
0 s<t− T or s>t
, (26)
where M(s,t) is the density of ﬁrms with vintage s technology at time t.T os e et h i sa s s u m e
that M(s,τ) satisﬁes (26) for all τ <t .T h e na tt ad e n s i t ymen(t−T) of existing ﬁrms upgrade
their technology and a density nent of ﬁrms come into existence. Both groups of ﬁrms adopt








where the last equality follows from (25). In consequence, if M(s,τ) satisﬁes (26) for τ <t
it also satisﬁes it for τ = t.
5.4 Equilibrium prices
We ﬁnd now equilibrium wage rates, interest rates, rental rates and shadow prices of capital.
To abbreviate we delete the adjective “shadow” from this point onwards.
Labor market. Given the solution to a representative ﬁrm’s maximization problem
17(see Section 3) the equilibrium wage rate at t must be such that ﬁr m sm a k ez e r op r o ﬁts.




Therefore, rather than equaling the marginal productivity of labor, the equilibrium wage rate
in our model equals the output, or the value added,o faﬁrm with vintage t − T capital.
Thus, the wage rate in our model reﬂects the quality of the marginal (most antiquated)
capital good. This suggests that wages are more sensitive to distortions in our model than
in a model in which the wage rate reﬂects the quality of the average capital good in the
economy (which is the case in a model with putty-putty technology and with wage equal to
marginal productivity). We show later that this is indeed the case.
Although the wage rate in our model is not equal to the marginal productivity of labor,
one can interpret the wage rate as equaling the social marginal contribution of an extra
worker. If one such worker is added to the economy, while the economy’s capital stock is
held constant, this worker would be assigned to the marginal plant (which is about to be
scrapped) and would increase the economy’s output by whatever output this plant produces.
Interest rates. Since output net of investment grows at the rate g and since consumption
grows at the rate
r−ρ
γ , see equation (22), market clearing dictates g =
r−ρ
γ .T h u s ,
r = γg + ρ. (28)
Dividends/Rental rates of capital. The rental rate of vintage-s capital at date t is
computed as follows. (27) shows that the wage rate is the value added at the marginal plant.
Consequently, the rental rate of capital of an infra-marginal plant is its value added over and
above the value added of the marginal plant
R(s,t)K(s)=e






after we substitute in from (27). We refer sometimes to these rental rates as dividends.
Since, as noted above, the wage rate is not equal to the marginal productivity of labor,
t h er e n t a lr a t ei sn o te q u a l( a te a c ha n de v e r yp o i n ti nt i m e )t ot h em a r g i n a lp r o d u c t i v i t yo f
18capital. Nonetheless, using (3) one can show that the discounted value of rental rates over
a replacement cycle equals to the discounted value of the marginal productivites of capital
over the same cycle. Hence capital is over-compensated early in the cycle (dividend exceeds
the marginal productivity) and under-compensated late in the cycle.
Price proﬁle. Substituting (29) into (23) we get
p(s,t)=pe
−δ(t−s)D(r + δ,T− (t − s))
D(r + δ,T)









Consider date t and a vintage s, t−T<s<t . Then (29) and (30) show that dividends and
capital prices are independent of t. Rather, they depend on the age of capital only, t − s.
Consequently, if calendar date is implicitly understood, one can write (which we do) p(t−s),
instead of p(s,t) and R(t − s), instead of R(s,t).I ft − s>Tvintage-s capital had already
been scrapped so p(t − s)=R(t − s)=0 .
Given ﬁrm prices, as given by (30), ω is determined12 as the equity value of all ﬁrms in






Given the above equilibrium, we construct now the theoretical counterparts of national
income statistics and perform comparative statics exercises with respect to them. The mo-
tivation for this is to establish a correspondence between observables and their theoretical
analogues. This allows us to calibrate the model, perform quantitative exercises, and com-
pare it (qualitatively and quantitatively) to alternative growth models.
At a point in time, say t, the aggregation procedure is to add across vintage-s ﬁrms,
where s ∈ [t − T,t]. For example, given the convention that each ﬁrm operates with one
12Once ω is pinned down z0 is determined, using (20), (22), (27), and (35), so that the consumer exhausts
her budget.
19worker, we conﬁrm that the economy’s labor force is fully employed
Total measure of ﬁrms at t =
t Z
t−T





nt = Labor Force,
where (25) is invoked to prove the last equality.
6.1 National income statistics
In this subsection we derive the theoretical counterparts of national income statistics. This
establishes a mapping between underlying parameters (e.g., α) and endogenous variables
(e.g., y). This mapping forms the base to a calibration exercise, i.e., one can invert this
mapping and use the values of observed variables to infer the values of unobserved ones.
Per-capita output. At t ﬁrms in the economy operate with vintage-s technology, where
s ∈ [t − T,t].V i n t a g e - s ﬁrms employ M(s,t) workers and produce a ﬂow of output Y (s,t)

















y ≡ mf(k)D(g + n + δ,T). (33)
Investment. At t ad e n s i t yment of ﬁrms invest in new capital. The quantity invested
by each such ﬁrm is K(t), which is given by (15). This implies that the economy wide
per-capita investment at t is
i(t)=mke
gt. (34)
Given (34), tax proceeds are










D(g + n + δ,T)
, (36)
where the equality follows after we substitute in from (32), (33) and (34).





¶σ [D(r + δ,T)]
σ
D(g + n + δ,T)
. (37)
This last equality follows from (36) after we substitute (65) and the ﬁrst equation in (9) into
it.
Factor-shares of income. Capital-income is the sum of rental rates on capital employed
by all ﬁrms. Since there is a density mens of vintage-s ﬁrms at time t,w h e r es ∈ [t − T,t],







After we substitute in from (15) and (29), we get






g + n + δ
− e




And dividing this by total output it follows that
αK =
D(g + n + δ,T) − e−(g+δ)TD(n,T)
D(g + n + δ,T)
, (38)
where αK is the capital-share of income.
By working out a similar computation, the labor-share of income is13
αL =
e−(g+δ)TD(n,T)
D(g + n + δ,T)
=1− αK. (39)
13Although it is “natural” that labor and capital shares add up to one this hinges on computing these
shares at market prices. If we compute them at factor costs they add up to less than one. The diﬀerernce is
the “distortion-share of income.”
21The value of the economy’s capital stock at market prices. Given the market
prices of capital and the (optimal) quantity of capital installed by each ﬁrm, the market










After substituting (23) into (40) and changing the order of integration we obtain
kM (t)=
e(g+n)t










Substituting (29) into (41), performing the integration and substituting the second equation
in (9) we get
kM (t)=
iM(t)
r − (g + n)
·
D(g + δ + n,T) − e−(g+δ)TD(n,T)







i.e., iM(t) ≡ pi(t) is the market value of the date-t investment.
kM(t) correspond to an empirical concept of capital at market prices, which accounts
for heterogeneity of capital goods. In particular it mirrors the NIPA practice of classifying
capital goods into categories according to their vintage, determining the market value of the
capital stock in each category by multiplying the quantity of capital by its market price, and
adding up over all categories;14 see Fraumeni (1997) and Katz and Herman (1997).
Three kinds of depreciation. Capital in our model undergoes three kinds of depre-
14This link between a theoretically constructed concept of capital at market prices and its empirical
counterpart is not found in any other paper that we are aware of.
22ciation: physical, which is due to wear and tear and denoted by δ, obsolescence, which is
due to the appearance of new and improved capital goods and denoted by g,a n de c o n o m i c ,
which is due to scrapping. The ﬁrst two depreciation rates are exogenously speciﬁed, model
primitives. The third, economic depreciation, is endogenously determined by the lifespan of








r − (g + n)
·
D(g + δ + n,T) − e−(g+δ)TD(n,T)




and call δEF the eﬀective depreciation rate. The analogue of δEF in the neoclassical model,
namely, the model with disembodied technological progress and putty-putty technology (and




δEF = g + n + δ.
Given this and given equation (49), δEF exceeds g +n+δ. Accordingly, we deﬁne economic
depreciation as the residual
δe ≡ δEF − (g + n + δ).
In the neoclassical model capital is never scrapped. Therefore there is no distinction between
physical and economic depreciation, so the calibrated value of physical depreciation reﬂect
both depreciation rates. Here, because capital is eventually scrapped, we distinguish between
physical and economic depreciation.
6.2 Comparative statics of national income statistics
In this subsection we show how distortions are manifested or, more speciﬁcally, how various
observables vary with p and how this compares with alternative growth models.15 In doing so
we suggest how our model can be assessed empirically and compared to alternative models.16
Comparative statics of per-capita output. Equation (32) shows that p has only a
level eﬀect on per-capita output, not a growth eﬀect. To examine how p aﬀects output, let
15The diﬀerence between what we do here and in Section 4 is that the comparative statics results here
pertain to economy-wide variables (i.e., national income statistics), whereas the comparative statics results
of Section 4 pertain to an individual ﬁrm’s variables.
16The results we derive here analytically are illustrated quantitively in our applications paper, using the
U.S. calibrated values of parameters.





1 − [u(p)]cf (k(p)), (44)





Equation (44) shows that distortions are manifested through a quantitative and a qualita-
tive channel. The third term on the RHS of (44) is the traditional quantitative channel.
Distortions stiﬂe capital accumulation and thereby reduce output. This is reﬂected in k(p).
The ﬁrst two terms represent the qualitative channel. Distortions lengthen the lifespan of
capital, causing the inventory of capital goods in the economy to be of higher average age
and lower average quality. This second eﬀect is reﬂected in u(p).
Equation (44) also shows that development data is interpreted diﬀerently depending on
which model one considers as the data generating model. If one looks at data on per capita
income and prices of capital goods (across countries) and considers it as being generated
by the neoclassical model when it is, in fact, generated by our model the ﬁrst two terms
would appear as total factor productivity. In other words, the ﬁrst two terms would have
the eﬀect of creating (“spurious”) variation which appears unexplained by variables that
are included in the model (p). On the other hand, from the perspective of our model this
variation is explained. In this sense our model accounts for a bigger fraction of per capita
income across countries as coming from distortions than the neoclassical model. This contrast
between diﬀerent data generating models can be assessed by executing a quantitative exercise
analogous to the one in Hall and Jones (1999).17
Equation (44) provides a related contrast between our model and the neoclassical model.
Given Proposition 1, y(p) vanishes at p = P(σ), i.e., an economy becomes poverty trapped
when distortions are suﬃciently large. We can do the same exercise that led to equation
(44) for the neoclassical model (which we do elsewhere), derive an analogous equation for
y(p) and study it for a commensurate value of σ. When we do that, an economy becomes
poverty trapped at a higher value of p and the y(p) curve spans a smaller range of incomes
17We execute this exercise in our applications paper.
24as p varies by comparison with the y(p) curve that our model generates. In this sense our
model accounts again for a greater fraction of income variation across countries as coming
from diﬀerential distortions.
Equation (44) expresses the level of income as a function of p. Sometimes it is more
convenient to work with the elasticity of income with respect to p. To obtain an expression










1+b − [h(u,a − 1) − h(u,a + b)] − σ−1
σ [h(u,c) − h(u,1+b + c)]
1+b
σ − [h(u,a − 1) − h(u,a + b)]
.
As shown in the Appendix, h is positive and decreasing in a. Hence this elasticity is negative
whenever the second order condition (11) is satisﬁed.
Comparative statics of the wage. Following analogous steps, we ﬁnd the eﬀect of









where for brevity, w stands for w0.S i n c eh decreases in a this elasticity is negative.













dp for the neoclassical model and shows that it equals −
αK
αL .




dp is bigger in absolute value) in our model
than in the neoclassical model.
Comparative statics of the price proﬁle and economic depreciation.W h e n
σ < 1,a ni n c r e a s ei np shifts the price proﬁle upwards. This holds even after we divide by p,
i.e., consider the normalized price proﬁle,
p(t−s)
p . To show this, it is convenient to work
with the transformed variable v = e−g(t−s).T h e nt h ee ﬀect of p on
p(v)
p is found by writing



















a+b − u1+b 1−ua−1
a−1
, (47)

























The Appendix shows that
h(u,a+b)
h(u,a−1) is increasing in u. Hence the RHS of (48) is negative,
which means that as p increases the normalized price proﬁle rotates upwards.
This feature of the model can be contrasted with data. What the model says is that if we
consider a speciﬁc capital good, say trucks or tractors (of a certain make and speciﬁcation),
they would be used for a longer time and their normalized price would decline more slowly
in poor countries. Indeed casual empiricism suggests that trucks are used for a longer time
in poor countries and that they command a positive market price when the same vintage
truck has already been retired in richer countries.













dτ > 0, (49)
which is due to (19) and (48).












Equation (50) provides a link between the estimable, macro parameter β and the unobserved,
micro parameter σ.I n d e e dβ can be estimated from cross country data on investment-output
ratios and capital prices; see Pessoa et al. (2003). Then the RHS of (50) can be used to infer
av a l u ef o rσ.






This last inequality follows because du
dp < 0, h is decreasing in a and 1+c<a .
On the other hand, the same elasticity, β,i se q u a lt oσ in the neoclassical model. As we
indicate in the next section this disparity between the estimable parameter β and the unob-
served, micro parameter σ has important quantitative implications concerning the extent to
which distortions aﬀect per capita income.










h(u,c) − h(u,1+b + c) − σ[h(u,a − 1) − h(u,a + b)]
1+b
σ − [h(u,a − 1) − h(u,a + b)]
. (51)
Equation (51), much like equation (50), links the estimable parameter η and the unobserved,
micro parameter σ. Thus one can alternatively use (51) to infer an empirically relevant value
for σ.





> σ for σ < 1.
On the other hand, in the neoclassical model the same elasticity, η,e q u a l sσ. Therefore
wages vary more with incomes in our model than in the neoclassical model.
7 Empirical Implications of the Theory and Compar-
ison to Related Growth Theories under Exogenous
Technological Progress
A variety of growth models have been used to interpret income diﬀerences across countries
and evaluate whether growth theory is quantitatively consistent with the view that income
diﬀerences are due to investment distortions. In this section we discuss empirical implications
of our theory and how they diﬀer - either qualitatively or quantitatively - from other theories.
We organize the list of empirical implications by contrasting them with three categories of
27alternative theories.
7.1 Disembodied technological progress with putty-putty technol-
ogy
1. The workhorse of growth and development is the neoclassical model. Lucas (1988),
Mankiw (1995), Restruccia and Urritia (2001) and Chari et al. (1997) show how this model is
applied to interpret income diﬀerences across countries.18 Technological progress in the neo-
classical model is disembodied and labor is continuously mobile across technologies. Given
these speciﬁcations, capital is a homogenous good (“jelly”) which is never scrapped - no
matter how old it is. In our model capital goods are heterogenous, each capital good is
eventually scrapped, the age at which it is scrapped depends on the distortion parameter p,
and the price of capital in second hand markets depends on p as well. Therefore one can
assess how diﬀerential distortions are reﬂected across countries by studying the service lifes
of capital and the price of capital on second hand markets. In other words, one can assess
whether the predictions expressed by equation (30) are borne out by data. In particular, if
one considers two countries that face diﬀerent p’s then the country with the higher p should
have longer service lifes of capital and the inventory of capital goods in it should have an
older average age. Furthermore the price proﬁle of capital will be diﬀerent in the two coun-
tries. If σ < 1, the empirically relevant case, the high p country will have a higher and ﬂatter
normalized price proﬁle and capital will be retired later.19 Therefore to assess the validity of
our theory one can simply look at the age and pricing structure of capital across countries.
Alternatively, one can examine one country and assess how a change in governmental policy
that aﬀects p is translated into changes in the service lifes of capital (or its price on second
hand markets). A recent paper that takes this approach is Kasahara (2002).
18An approach which uses much the same ideas is found in Greenwood et al. (1997); see also the sur-
vey paper by Jovanovic and Greenwood (2001). Although the Greenwood et al. (1997) paper considers
investment-speciﬁc technological change (i.e., capital whose cost of production decreases over time), which
shares some similarities with our embodied technological change approach, there is no such thing as vintage-
capital in the Greenwood et al. model (1997). Instead, capital is envisioned as a homogenous good that
enters into an aggregate production function. Thus, none of the issues relating to the lifespan of capital and
the pricing of capital goods of diﬀerent vintages arise in that paper. Furthermore, Greenwood et al. (1997)
consider a single economy, the U.S., so they don’t perform the comparative statics results with respect to p,
which is one of the main focuses of our paper.
19The price proﬁle in the neoclassical model is exponential, e−(δ+g)t, and is independent of p.
282. A second implication is that distortions have a greater impact on per capita income in
our theory than in the neoclassical theory. In either theory the impact of distortions depends
on the micro parameter σ.T h el o w e ri sσ the lower is the marginal productivity of capital
and the stronger is the impact of distortions. In particular, the y(p) curve spans a larger
range of incomes as p varies, and the lowest price at which an economy becomes poverty
trapped is lower the lower is σ, see equation (14) and discussion following Proposition 1.
Therefore, whether distortions account for income diﬀerences for a reasonable range of p’s
depends on the σ that is consistent with this theory and with observed data. The observed
data that allows one to recover σ is the elasticity β of the investment-output ratio with
respect to p (or alternatively the elasticity η). Once this elasticity is known the value of σ
that is consistent with it depends on the theoretical mapping from β to σ, see equation (50).
The mapping that our theory produces is such that it assigns a lower value of σ for every
β than the neoclassical theory. In this sense distortions play a more important role in our
theory. The reason for this again is that distortions aﬀect not only the quantity of installed
capital but also it quality. Countries with a higher value of p operate with less capital, and
with capital of lower average quality.
3. A third implication is that the relationship between the capital-output ratio and the
distortion parameter p is u-shaped (for any value of σ, 0 ≤ σ < 1). This contrasts with
the neoclassical theory where this relationship is downward sloping. This gives a simple
criterion, in terms of observables, to distinguish between the theories. The reason for this
u-shapedness is that capital is held for a longer time and that its price declines more slowly,
which results in a higher market valuation of the capital stock.
7.2 Embodied technological progress with putty-putty technology
Another class of models that are potentially applicable to the development issues discussed
above are the putty-putty models with embodied technological progress. The ﬁrst model of
this genre is due to Solow (1959) and its extensions are studied by Levhari and Sheshinski
(1969, 1972).20 In this class of putty-putty models, as in our model, technological progress
is embodied in capital goods. The main diﬀerence is that labor is assumed mobile across
vintages in the putty-putty model, whereas we assume that it is not; instead we assume that
20Fisher (1965) shows the set of circumstances under which the aggregation properties used by Solow
(1959) are valid with a generally speciﬁed production function.
29once a plant is designed it retains its capital-labor ratio until it is scrapped. Based on the
analysis here and on calibration of the putty-putty model, we ﬁnd several empirical features
that diﬀerentiate the embodied, putty-putty model from our model.
One diﬀerence is that, in the putty-putty model, scrapping either does not occur (when
σ ≥ 1)o rt h a ti to c c u r s( w h e nσ < 1) for unrealistically large values of T. Relatedly, the
labor-capital ratio tends to zero as a plant ages in the putty-putty model, whereas in our
model it remains bounded away from zero. Finally, wages equal the value of the marginal
productivity of labor in the putty-putty model, while in our model they equal the output
of the most antiquated plant in the economy (see equation (27)). This results from the
assumption that labor is immobile and hence a theory in which the wage rate equals the
marginal productivity of labor is not applicable. As a result of this, our model accounts for
the fact that workers employed in similar establishments (same age plant and equipment,
producing the same output) earn lower salaries in poor (highly distorted) countries than
in richer countries. This prediction can be assessed by looking at the salary structure of
multinational enterprises (McDonald, WalMart, etc.) that operate similar establishments in
diﬀerent countries. Assuming that one can control for variation in total factor productiv-
ity, one can also assess this prediction by looking at the empirical counterpart of (46) and
determine how fast wages decline as the price of capital varies across countries.
7.3 Embodied technological progress with putty-clay technology
Our formulation is in the spirit of a class of models that were studied in the 1960’s and
include Johansen (1959), Phelps (1963), Solow et al. (1966), Sheshinski (1967), Bliss (1968)
and Bardhan (1969). Arrow’s (1962) learning by doing model also employs this assumption.
Compared with this literature our model incorporates an extra ingredient, the distortion
parameter p, and shows the role that this parameter plays and, in particular, its role in
explaining income diﬀerences across countries. A further extension is that we derive the
price proﬁle of capital goods and various national income statistics, which allows us to
calibrate and apply the model to development data.
A recent model along the same lines is Jovanovic and Rob (1997); see also Parente
(2000) and Mateus-Planas (2002). The main diﬀerence from Jovanovic and Rob (1997) is
that we specify a more general production function, namely we consider the family of C.E.S.
production functions (instead of the Leontieﬀ production function which is a particular
30member of this family). This, together with the relationship that links estimable parameters
and parameters of this production function (equation (50)), allow us to pin down a production
function based on data. It also allows us to consider both the quantitative margin, i.e., how
much capital the ﬁrm installs as well as the qualitative margin, i.e., how frequently the ﬁrm
upgrades its technology and hence with what quality capital it operates. In addition to this,
we analyze more fully general equilibrium features of the model, including the determination
of wages and prices of capital of diﬀerent vintages. This allows us to generate a theoretical
counterpart to the concept of “capital at market prices” (see equation (42)), which is in
accordance with NIPA practice. On all these counts, the C.E.S. approach seems to be richer
and hence better suited to be taken to data and used to evaluate development facts. We
do this in our companion, applications paper, and show that this generalized model delivers
indeed better results.
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34A Appendix
The appendix is divided into seven parts. In A.1 we show that the optimal lifespan of capital
is no shorter than some critical age τ > 0 and thus that the ﬁrm’s problem can be reduced
to a program in which technology is upgraded at discretely spaced points in time. In A.2 we
prove that a solution to this program exists. In A.3 we characterize this solution. In A.4 we
analyze the ﬁrst and second order conditions to the ﬁrm’s problem and derive comparative
statics properties of the solution. In A.5 we gather several results that are used in the course
of this analysis. In A.6 we derive comparative static properties of national income statistics.
In A.7 we prove properties of the price proﬁle.
A.1 Reducing the problem to a sequence program
To this point we made no assumptions on the sets of upgrade dates that the ﬁrm is able
to choose from. If any such set were feasible, it would not be possible to deﬁne the value
of the ﬁrm’s objective for some sets of upgrade dates. This is due to the fact that the
ﬁrm’s objective, i.e., its discounted value, is a certain integral (see below) and this integral is
undeﬁned if the set of upgrade dates is not measurable. To overcome this technical diﬃculty
we restrict the set of upgrade dates to be such that the lifespan of capital is positive, i.e.,
the ﬁrm has to wait a positive amount of time between upgrades. Then we deﬁne the value
of the ﬁrm’s objective to be the supremum over all such plans when the lifespan of capital is
allowed to be arbitarily short. The message of this section is that the ﬁrm does not exercise
the option to arbitrarily shorten the lifespan of capital. To the contrary, there is a positive
length of time so that the ﬁrm holds capital for at least this length of time. This allows us to
restrict attention to discrete upgrade plans with a countable number of upgrades and this, in
turn, allows us to exploit the usual methods of dynamic optimization in discrete time. The
ﬁr s ts t e pi nt h i sa p p r o a c hi st od e ﬁne the value of the ﬁrm’s objective (discounted proﬁts)
under this restriction.













be the increment to the ﬁrm’s objective in the time interval [0,t 0) when the ﬁrm holds on
to its initial capital stock for t0 > 0 units of time, and when (s0,K 0) is the ﬁrm’s initial












be the increment to the ﬁrm’s objective in the time interval [t,t0) when capital is upgraded
at dates t and t0,w i t hK units of capital being installed at t.
Let Z =( ti,K i)∞
i=1,w h e r eti is the ith upgrade time and Ki i st h ea m o u n to fc a p i t a l
installed at time ti, be an upgrade plan. The set of feasible upgrade plans is such that






If t1 =0 ,t h eﬁrst term of J(Z) is zero. Let ε > 0 and consider the problem of maximizing
J over upgrade plans for which ti+1 −ti ≥ ε. Let the supremum of J over these plans be J∗
ε.







To analyze this objective we start out by considering the quantity-of-capital choice problem




where τ is understood now as the lifespan of capital of vintage t, i.e., τ = t0 − t.
We know that vt,τ(K) is strictly concave in K, so the above programming problem has
one solution at most. We analyze this problem by studying 0 ≤ σ < 1 and 1 < σ < 2
separately.










is such that limK→∞ Q0
t(K)=0 ,a n dt h u slimK→∞ vt,τ(K)=−∞ (given any (t,τ) pair).
Therefore (52) has a unique optimal solution. Since the constraint equation is linear, this
solution is characterized by the Kuhn-Tucker conditions. We have the following lemma.




Then the unique optimal solution to (52) is K∗ =0 . The maximized value v∗
t,τ ≡ vt,τ(0) is
zero as well.




















This K∗ is increasing, ﬁnite, and continuous in τ. The maximized value v∗
t,τ ≡ vt,τ(K∗) is





















with λ non-negative. One can show that
v
0




t(K) − p = D(r + δ,τ)α
σ
σ−1 − p.
(i) Hence D(r + δ,τ)α
σ
σ−1 ≤ p implies that v0
t,τ(0) ≤ 0,m e a n i n gt h a tλ = −v0
t,τ(0) ≥ 0 and
K∗ =0is the (unique) solution to (55).




In this case we have that v0
t,τ(0) > 0,a n ds oK =0cannot be part of a solution pair to (55).
Instead the optimal solution K∗ to (52) is given by the unique (unconstrained) solution to
the ﬁrst order condition v0
t,τ(K)=0 . Tedious calculations show that K∗ is given by equation
(53). Plugging K∗ into vt,τ(K) we obtain, after some more calculations, that v∗
t,τ is given by
(54). Since D(r + δ,τ)α
σ




σ ⇒ [D(r + δ,τ)]
1−σpσ−1
ασ > 1,
and so K∗,v ∗
t,τ > 0, as was claimed. That K∗ is increasing and continuous in τ is veriﬁed by
inspecting (53) and that v∗
t,τ is increasing in t and τ is veriﬁed by inspecting (54).
Q.E.D







Then there exists a τ > 0 with the following property. The only capital upgrade plans that
can be optimal are the ones where ti+1 − ti > τ and Ki > 0.
Proof: Consider the equation
D(r + δ,τ)α
σ
σ−1 = p. (57)
Since D(r + δ,τ)α
σ
σ−1, considered as a function of τ alone, is strictly increasing, takes the









= P(σ) >p ,
we know that (57) has a positive solution τ. Furthermore, because of the monotonicity,
τ ≤ τ implies that D(r + δ,τ)α
σ
σ−1 ≤ p.
38Consider now an upgrade plan Z =( ti,K i)∞
i=1 and assume tj+1 − tj ≤ τ for some j or
Kj =0(or both). Then, by Lemma 1, v∗
tj,tj+1 =0 . If the continuation proﬁtf r o mtj+1
o n w a r d si sz e r oa sw e l l ,t h eﬁrm can increase its proﬁt by upgrading for the last time at tj
and installing a positive quantity of capital. This follows from Lemma 1. If the continuation
proﬁtf r o mtj+1 onwards is not zero then, again by Lemma 1, we know that there must be
an upgrade date tm ≥ tj+1 for which tm+1 − tm > τ and Km > 0. Consider the ﬁrst such





i=1 as follows. t
0
i = ti and K
0
i = Ki for
i =1 ,...,j −1, t
0
j = tj, Kj = Kme−g(tm−tj), t
0
j+n = tm+n, K
0
j+n = Km+n for n =1 ,2,....S i n c e
r>gthe value of this plan is higher than the value of the original plan.
Q.E.D
Lemma 2 shows that if the ﬁrm installs a positive amount of capital it holds on to it for
an amount of time, which is no shorter than some positive lower bound, τ. This has been
shown for the case 0 ≤ σ < 1. The next set of results extends this to 1 < σ < 2.
(B) The case where 1 < σ < 2.




We still have that the above problem is a concave programming problem, so that if it has




σ−1,s ot h a ti fp is too small, problem (58) will not have an optimal
solution. The ﬁrm, in this case, will want to install an inﬁnite amount of capital. A suﬃ-








From now on, this will be our underlying assumption.
One can show that when σ ∈ (1,2), limK→0 Q0
t(K)=+ ∞, which means that the ﬁrm
will always install a positive amount K∗ of capital no matter how small τ is. This follows
from the proof of Lemma 4, and is in sharp contrast with what happens when σ ∈ (0,1).
Remember that we deﬁned v∗
t,τ ≡ vt,τ(K∗). Since the algebra involved in ﬁnding the
unique solution to the ﬁrst order condition Q0
















The next 3 lemmas will be necessary in the proof of the main result of this section.
Lemma 3 Let h :[ 0 ,1] → R be the function given by
h(z)=σq(σ)(a + b)z(1 − z)
σ−2 − (1 + b)[1 − q(σ)(1 − z)
σ−1], (59)
where a ≥ 1, b ≥ 0 and q(σ) ∈ (0,1). Then there exists a unique u ∈ (0,1) such that
h(ua+b)=0 .M o r e o v e r ,h(va+b) ≥ 0 if, and only if, v ≥ u.
Proof: If we let ξ =1− ua+b and η = 1+b














Denote by f(ξ) and g(ξ) the right-hand side and the left-hand side, respectively, of the above
equation. Observe that f is strictly decreasing and, since σ < 2,t h a tg is strictly increasing.
Moreover, f(0) = 1, f(1) =
η
σ, g(0) = 0 and g(1) =
η
σq(σ).S i n c e q(σ) < 1 by hypothesis,
f(1) <g (1). Hence f(ξ) − g(ξ)=0has a unique solution ξ ∈ (0,1).W e a l s o k n o w t h a t
g(ξ) >f (ξ) if, and only if, ξ > ξ.N o w ,s i n c eh(ξ) is proportional to f(ξ) − g(ξ), h(ξ) ≥ 0
if, and only if, ξ ≤ ξ. Therefore h(va+b) ≥ 0 if, and only if, v ≥ u,w h e r eua+b =1− ξ.
Q.E.D
Lemma 4 There exists a τ such that if τ ≤ τ,t h e n
v0,τ ≥ v0,τ1 + e
−(r−g)τ1vτ1,τ
for all 0 ≤ τ1 < τ.




























where P(σ) is given by (56). If we let v,u,u and q(σ) be given by
v = e
−gτ1,u = e







then the above inequality can be rewritten as
1 − ua+b
n





























with a = r
g and b = δ
g.N o w ﬁx u ≥ u and consider G(v,u) as a function of v alone, with









and so, since G is smooth, it has at least one critical point in the open interval (u,1).A f t e r



















a−1 (a + b)(u
v)a+b
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where h is the function deﬁned in (59).
Let us deﬁne u implicitly by h(ua+b)=0 .I nL e m m a3w es a wt h a tu exists, is unique,
a n di ss u c ht h a th(va+b) ≥ 0 if, and only if, v ∈ [0,1] is such that v ≥ u. Therefore any
critical point v ∈ (u,1) of G(v,u),w i t hu ≥ u ﬁxed, is such that ∂2G
∂v2 > 0.T h i si ss ob e c a u s e
v>u≥ u,s ot h a th(va+b) > 0,a n du





> 0. Hence we must
have G(v,u) ≤ G(u,u)=G(1,u) for all v ∈ (u,1), otherwise G will have a local maximum
in (u,1), which we have just ruled out.
Q.E.D
Lemma 5 Let G(v,u) be the function introduced in Lemma 4. There exists a δ > 0 such
that for all u ∈ (0,u),w h e r eu was deﬁned in the same lemma, the function Gu(v): =G(v,u),
with v ∈ [u,1], has no local maximum in the intervals [1 − δ,1) and (u,u + δ].
Proof: Let us show ﬁr s tt h a tt h e r ee x i s t saδ1 > 0 such that for all u ∈ (u,1) the function
Gu(v) has no local maximum in [1 − δ1,1).F o rt h i sl e tδ0 ∈ (0,1) be such that u + δ0 < 1
for all u ∈ (0,u).T h e nv ∈ [u + δ0,1) implies that there is an η ∈ (0,1) with the property
that u
v < η for all u ∈ (0,u). Since the function h deﬁned in Lemma 3 is strictly increasing,






a+b),(1 + b)[1 − q(σ)]} = M1 < ∞.









where α > 0, is non-negative and bounded above. If we let M2 =s u p {f(ξ;a+b):ξ ∈ [0,1]},
then, for all u ∈ (0,u) and all v ∈ [u + δ0,1),w eh a v et h a t












¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
<M 1M2 = M,
42since a ≥ 1.T o ﬁnish note that limv→1 h(va+b)=+ ∞.B y t a k i n g δ0 such that u + δ0 is
suﬃciently close to one, we can then have that f(va+b)h(va+b) > 2M.T h e r e f o r e ,v ≥ 1−δ1,








and so if any critical point v∗ of G lies in [1 − δ1,1),i tc a n n o tb eal o c a lm a x i m u m .
A similar argument shows that there exists δ2 > 0 such that if v ∈ (u,u + δ2],t h e nv
cannot be a local maximum of Gu(v) no matter what is the value of u in (0,u).B yt a k i n g
δ =m i n {δ1,δ2} we have the desired result.
Q.E.D
Lemmas 3-5 show that the lifespan of capital is bounded away from zero in case 1 < σ < 2
and p>P (σ). The next set of results apply to 0 ≤ σ < 1 and p<P (σ) as well as to
1 < σ < 2 and p>P(σ)
Lemma 6 No plan with a last upgrade time is optimal.
Proof: Consider a capital upgrade plan with a last upgrade. Let t b et h ed a t eo ft h i sl a s t
upgrade and denote by u0,t t h ev a l u eo ft h ep l a ni nt h ei n t e r v a l[0,t).T h ev a l u eo ft h i sp l a n
is then given by



















where K is the optimal amount of capital installed at t. Consider now the capital upgrade
plan that is obtained from the one above by adding one more upgrade at time t0 >t .T h e
v a l u eo ft h i sn e wp l a ni s
v
0 = u0,t + e
−rt{D(r + δ,t





























43where K0 is the amount of capital installed at t0.S i n c ev∗
t0,∞ is increasing in t0 (see Lemma
1), we can take vt0,∞(K0)=v∗
t,∞ > 0 by appropriately choosing K0.T h e n
v


























Since vt0,∞(K0) is a positive constant (= v∗
t,∞) and since e−δ(t0−t) converges to zero as t0 →∞ ,
by choosing t0 suﬃciently large we can make the term inside the braces strictly positive. But
this contradicts the optimality of v∗
t,∞. So no capital upgrade plan with a last upgrade time
is optimal.
Q.E.D
Since for any given amount K of capital, limt→∞ e−rtQt(K) = limt→∞ e−δtQt(K)=0 ,
Lemma 6 implies the following corollary.
Corollary 1 There exists a τ > τ such that no capital upgrade plan with lifespan of capital
τ > τ can be optimal.
This corollary holds also for the ﬁrm’s initial upgrade and is independent of how much
capital the ﬁrm has to begin with, K0. We are now ready to state and prove the main result
of this section.
Theorem 1 Suppose σ ∈ [0,1) and p<P (σ) or σ ∈ (1,2) and p>P (σ),w h e r eP(σ) is
given by (56). Let T(Z) b et h es e to fu p g r a d et i m e so fZ where a positive amount of capital is
installed. Then the only capital upgrade plans Z that can be optimal are the ones satisfying
the following properties.
(i) The set T(Z) is inﬁnite, has a ﬁrst element, and for any t,t0 ∈ T(Z), τ ≥ |t − t0| ≥ τ,
where τ and τ are given by Lemma 2, Lemma 4 and Corollary 1, respectively.
(ii) Suppose t,t0 ∈ T(Z), with t<t 0,b et w oc o n s e c u t i v ee l e m e n t so fT(Z). Then there is no
upgrade time between t and t0.
44Proof: ( i )F r o mL e m m a6w ek n o wt h a tn op l a nw i t haﬁnite number of upgrades can be
optimal. Moreover, installing zero capital yields zero ﬂow payoﬀ.T h e r e f o r e ,T(Z) must be
inﬁnite. Suppose now that T(Z) has no ﬁrst element. Since T(Z) ⊂ R+,t h e r em u s tb ea
sequence in T(Z) that converges from above to some non-negative t. This implies that the
interval I =[ t,t + τ),w i t hs o m eτ ≤ τ , has two upgrade times where a positive amount
of capital is installed. Then, according to Lemmas 2 and 4, Z cannot be optimal. Hence
T(Z) has a ﬁrst element. Also from Lemmas 2 and 4 and Corollary 1, we know that for any
t,t0 ∈ T(Z),w em u s th a v eτ ≥ |t − t0| ≥ τ.
(ii) Let t,t0 ∈ T(Z),w i t ht<t 0,b et w oc o n s e c u t i v ee l e m e n t so fT(Z). Suppose that there is
an upgrade time t00 ∈ (t,t0).S i n c et00 is not an element of T(Z), zero capital is installed at
t00. By removing all such upgrade times, we strictly increase the payoﬀ of the ﬁrm, and so Z
cannot be optimal.
Q.E.D
Theorem 1 simpliﬁes the task of determining whether there is an optimal capital upgrade
plan, and establishing what it looks like. We can restrict our attention to capital upgrade
plans such that:
(i) The number of upgrade times where a positive amount of capital is installed is inﬁnite.
(i) There is a ﬁrst time t1 where a positive amount of capital is installed.
(iii) After t1, only upgrades with a positive amount of capital installed are possible, and they
must be discretely spaced.
For such capital upgrade plans, what happens before t1 is irrelevant since, by the above, the
ﬁrm installs zero capital at such times. Therefore we can assume, without loss of generality,
that there are no upgrade times before t1.
45A.2 Existence of an optimal plan
We have seen that any optimal plan, if it exists, must never have a last upgrade time, and it
also cannot have more than 2 upgrade times within any interval of length τ ≤ τ,w h e r eτ is
some positive, ﬁnite real number. This means that we can restrict our attention to capital
upgrade plans that have a countable number of discretely spaced upgrade times. In other
words, the relevant capital upgrade plans are given by inﬁnite double sequences (ti,K i)∞
i=1,
where ti is the ith upgrade time, with ti+1 −ti ≥ τ,a n dKi is the amount of capital installed
at time ti.D e n o t es u c hap l a nb yZ. The value associated with Z is
J(Z)=e


























where (s0,K 0) is the ﬁrm’s initial condition.
Instead of the upgrade times, ti, we let the elapsed times, τi,b e t w e e nt h eith and (i+1)th
u p g r a d et i m e sb et h ec h o i c ev a r i a b l e s .T h i sm e a n st h a tτi = ti+1−ti and ti =
Pi−1
j=0 τj,w i t h

































and now Z = {τ0,(τi,K i)∞
i=1} ∈ [0,τ] × [τ,τ]∞ × [0,+∞)∞. Dividing and multiplying the
ith term by e
−g
Pi−1





































46Finally deﬁning ki to be ki = Kie
−g
Pi−1

























where again Z ∈ [0,τ] × [τ,τ]∞ × [0,+∞)∞.
By the corollary to Lemma 6 we know that τi ≤ τ for i ≥ 1.B y L e m m a 1 w e k n o w
that the optimal amount ki to be installed in the interval [ti,t i+1) is written as κ(τi),w h e r e
κ(·) depends only and continuously on τi. Since, for all i, τi is restricted to [τ,τ] and since
κ(·) is increasing, we know that ki must be restricted, for all i, to the set [0,k],w h e r e
k ≡ κ(τ). These arguments allow us to restrict Z to the set S =[ 0 ,τ] × [τ,τ]∞ × [0,k]∞.
Endow S, which is an inﬁnite product of compact sets, with the product topology. Then,
by Tychonoﬀ’s theorem, S is compact. If we show that J is continuous over S we will have
that there exists an optimal upgrade plan.
Since S, endowed with the product topology, has a countable base, it is metrizable. A











where | |·| |is the Euclidian distance in R2, Z = {τ0,(τi,k i)∞






are two arbitrary elements of S and k0 = k
0
0 =0 .L e t ε > 0 be any positive number and
consider the continuous functions Li given by
L0(τ,k)=e










σ−1 − pk, i =1 ,2,...











Because each Li is continuous, we know that there exists a δ > 0 so that if max{|τ −τ0|,|k−
47k0|} ≤ δ,t h e n|Li(τ,k)−Li(τ0,k 0)| ≤ ε
2j, i =0 ,...,j−1.L e tδ
0 = δ
2j and suppose that Z,Z0 ∈
S are such that d(Z,Z0) < δ
0. Then, since max{|τi −τ0
i|,|ki −k0
i|} ≤ ||(τi,k i)−(τ0
i,k 0
i)||,w e
know that max{|ki − k0
i|,|τi − τ0
i|} ≤ 2iδ


















showing that J is indeed a continuous function from S into R.
Summarizing we have the following result.
Theorem 2 Assume σ ∈ [0,1) and p<P(σ) or σ ∈ (1,2) and p>P(σ).T h e nt h e r ee x i s t s
an optimal capital upgrade plan. It will have an inﬁnite number of upgrades that are discretely
spaced, with a minimum and a maximum time between any two consecutive upgrades.
48A.3 Characterization of the optimal plan
To simplify the exposition we assume ﬁr s tt h a tt h eﬁrm’s initial condition is such that
(s0,K 0)=( s0,0) with s0 ≤ 0. In this case the ﬁrm installs a positive amount of capital at
t =0 ,c a l li tk0, which is shown in the next lemma.
Lemma 7 Assume K0 =0 . Then the ﬁrst upgrade date is t1 =0and the ﬁrm installs a
positive quantity of capital at that time.
Proof. Assume ﬁrst 0 ≤ σ < 1 and consider an arbitrary upgrade plan (ti,K i)∞
i=1 with
t1 > 0.T h e nt h eﬁrm collects zero during [0,t 1). Consider the plan (ti−1,K ie−gt1)∞
i=1,w h e r e
t0 =0 . Then, since r>g , this plan gives the ﬁrm a higher value.
Second assume 1 < σ < 2 and consider an arbitrary upgrade plan (ti,K i)∞
i=1 with t1 > 0.
Then, since limK→0 Q0
t(K)=+ ∞, one can choose a small enough k0 so that the value of the
plan with upgrade at t1 =0and with k0 capital installed at that time is higher than the
value of the original plan. Theorem 1 implies then that k0 > 0.
At the end of this subsection we discuss what changes if K0 is arbitrarily speciﬁed.




where J(Z) is given by (60) and S =[ τ,τ]∞ × [0,k]∞. If we separate the ﬁrst upgrade
decision from the remaining upgrade decisions we have that





σ−1 − pk1 + e
−(r−g)τ1J(Z \ (τ1,k 1)),
where now, as a matter of notation, Z =( τ1,k 1,τ2,k 2,...) and Z\(τ1,k 1)=( τ2,k 2,τ3,k 3,...).
This allows us to write the ﬁrm’s problem as
max D(r + δ,τ1)f(k1) − pk1 + e−(r−g)τ1J(Z \ (τ1,k 1))
s.t.Z =( τ1,k 1,τ2,k 2,...) ∈ S,
where the function f is





49The following simple lemma will be central.
Lemma 8 Let f, g and h be any three ﬁnite functions, with h strictly positive. Then (x∗,y∗)
maximizes f(x)+h(x)g(y) if, and only if, y∗ maximizes g and x∗ maximizes f(x)+h(x)g(y∗).













thus establishing the necessity.






for all x,y, where the last inequality follows because h is positive.
Q.E.D
Therefore, (τ1,k 1,τ2,k 2,...) is an optimal capital upgrade plan if, and only if, it has the
following 2 properties.
(i) Z0 =( τ2,k 2,...) maximizes J,t h a ti s ,Z0 is itself an optimal capital upgrade plan for the
ﬁrm.
(ii) The pair (τ1,k 1) maximizes D(r + δ,τ)f(k) − pk + e−(r−g)τJ∗,w h e r eJ∗ is the value to
the ﬁrm of any optimal capital upgrade plan.
From this observation we can prove the following result, telling us that among the optimal
capital upgrade plans we can ﬁnd ones in which the action choice of the ﬁr mi st h es a m ei n
every period.
Lemma 9 Let J∗ be the value of an optimal upgrade plan. Then the plan (τi,k i)∞
i=1,w h e r e
τi = τ and ki = k, with the pair (τ,k) being an optimal solution to
max
©




50is an optimal capital upgrade plan.
Proof: This follows from repeatedly applying the previous lemma plus the observation that
follows it.
Q.E.D
Consequently, if we restrict ourselves to time invariant capital upgrade plans and look for
one that is optimal in this subclass, then we will ﬁnd one that is optimal among all possible
capital upgrade plans. Moreover, if we can determine that there is a unique optimal time
invariant plan, then this plan will be the unique optimal plan among the set of all possible
capital upgrade plans. To see why this is the case, suppose, to the contrary, that there is a
time varying plan that is optimal, but there is a unique optimal time invariant plan. Denote
the latter by (τ,k),a n dl e tt be the ﬁr s td a t ea tw h i c ht h et i m ev a r y i n gp l a ns p e c i ﬁes a
behavior diﬀerent from (τ,k). By hypothesis, we know that such a date exists. Let (τ0,k0)
be what this time varying plan speciﬁes at t. But we know, from the reasoning made above,
that (τ0,k0) maximizes
D(r + δ,τ)f(k) − pk + e
−(r−g)τJ
∗,
and so the plan that speciﬁes (τ0,k0) at every upgrade date is optimal according to the
previous lemma. This, however, contradicts our assumption that there is a unique optimal
time invariant capital upgrade plan.
With what was said in the previous paragraph in mind, let us determine whether an
optimal time invariant capital upgrade plan exists and is unique. To this end let’s write a
restricted objective function, i.e., let’s impose the requirement that the capital upgrade plan
is time invariant on the objective function and that the initial condition is such that K0 =0 .
Then the objective function is
∞ X
i=0
[D(r + δ,τ)f(k) − pk]e
−(r−g)iτ =
D(r + δ,τ)f(k) − pk
1 − e−(r−g)τ .
Alternatively, using the transformation
u = e
−gτ,





a+b f(k) − pk
1 − ua−1 . (61)
It remains to show that (61) admits a unique maximum, which we do in Section A.4.
Modulo that we have the following result.
Theorem 3 Let the ﬁrm’s initial condition (s0,K 0) be such that K0 =0≥ s0. The problem
of the ﬁrm has a unique optimal solution, and this optimal solution has the feature that
all upgrades are done at equally spaced intervals with spacing τ and the amount of capital
installed at each upgrade is kegt,w h e r ek is a constant and t is the upgrade time. The optimal
(k,τ) is the unique maximizer of the restricted objective function (61).
If (s0,K 0) is arbitrarily speciﬁed, the analysis proceeds as follows. Let τ0 be the ﬁrst
time the ﬁrm upgrades. We know that such time exists, otherwise the ﬁrm’s continuation
payoﬀ converges zero, and she can do better by replacing her initial capital at some late
enough date. From τ0 on, the ﬁrm’s problem is exactly as above. Let (τi,k i)∞
i=1 =( τ,k)∞
i=1
be the unique capital upgrade plan from τ0 on, where τ and k are as in Theorem 3. Let J∗
be the value of (τi,k i)∞
i=1. Then the value to the ﬁrm of upgrading her capital at τ0 is
U(τ0)=D(r + δ,τ0)Q0 + e
−rτ0J
∗,
where Q0 = eδs0Qs(K0), K0 being the initial amount of capital the ﬁrm is endowed with and
s0 being the vintage of this capital. The problem of the ﬁrm is then to maximize U(τ0).








Multiplying the RHS of (62) by erτ0,w es e et h a tU0(τ0)=0h a sa tm o s to n ep o s i t i v es o l u t i o n
and that U is single peaked. If it has a positive solution τ∗
0,t h e nτ∗
0 is the unique solution
to the problem of maximizing U(τ0) and, by (62), τ∗
0 is increasing in K0. If (62) does not
have a positive solution, then τ∗
0 =0is the unique solution to this problem. In any way, the
choice of τ0 is unique. If s0+T ≤ 0 and K0 ≤ K(s0), τ0 =0 ;i fs0 +T ≤ 0 and K0 >K (s0),
τ0 > 0 or τ0 > 0 - depending on how large is K0. The larger is K0 the larger is τ0. Similarly,
if s0 + T>0 and K0 >K (s0), τ0 > 0 and τ0 is larger the larger is K0;i fs0 + T>0 and
K0 ≤ K(s0), τ0 ≥ 0 and τ0 is larger the larger is K0.
52In summary, we have the following theorem.
Theorem 4 Let the ﬁrm’s initial condition (s0,K 0) be arbitrarily speciﬁed, K0 ≥ 0 ≥ s0.
The problem of the ﬁrm in this case also has a unique solution. It is given by {τ0,(τ,k)∞
i=1},
where τ,k are as in Theorem 3. The choice of the ﬁrst period τ0 of upgrade is either τ0 =0
or the unique interior solution to U0(τ0)=0 , if it exists, where U0(τ0) is given by equation
(62). This initial τ0 is larger the larger is the initial s0 and the larger is K0.
53A.4 Analysis of the FOCs and the SOCs to problem (61) and
comparative statics results.
A.4.1 Existence





a+b f(k) − pk
1 − ua−1 .





a+b f0(k) − p














(1 − ua−1)2 . (64)
Note that a (k,u) pair solves (63) and (64) if and only if it solves (9).

























Assuming that 0 ≤ σ < 1 and p<P(σ) we show in Section A.5 (Property 1) that the LHS
of (66) is negative at u =0and positive in a left neighborhood of u =1 . Since the LHS is
continuous this implies that a solution to (66) (and hence to equations (63) and (64)) exists.
A.4.2 Uniqueness
We prove uniqueness and maximality of a critical point by showing that the Hessian of F is








1 − ua−1 ,




1 − ua−1 ,
Fuu =
−f(k)
g (1 + b)ua+b−2
1 − ua−1 ,
where Fku incorporates the condition that Fk =0and Fuu incorporates the condition that
Fu =0 .F a c t o r i n g 1
g(1−ua−1) out of the Hessian matrix and incorporating the same conditions








































































and where we use the deﬁnition of σ
σ ≡−
f0 (k)[f (k) − kf0 (k)]
kf (k)f00 (k)
(68)




























































− [h(u,a − 1) − h(u,a + b)]
¾
.(70)
Since h is decreasing in a (see Property 2 in Section A.5), ∆ > 0 if and only if
1+b
σ
− [h(u,a − 1) − h(u,a + b)] > 0.
In Section A.5 we show (Property 2) that this is true whenever 0 ≤ σ ≤ 2.
A.4.3 Comparative statics of the ﬁrm’s problem
The procedure for ﬁnding comparative statics properties is to implicitly diﬀerentiate equa-





























dp we compute ∆u
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¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
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σ − [h(u,a − 1) − h(u,a + b)]
= −





σ − [h(u,a − 1) − h(u,a + b)]
,
57which is equation (17) in the text.
As we show in Section A.5 (Property 2 and corollary to it), h is positive, decreasing in a
and 1+b
σ − [h(u,a − 1) − h(u,a + b)] > 0 for 0 ≤ σ ≤ 2. Consequently, if 0 ≤ σ < 1,
pdu
udp < 0




dp we compute ∆k




















¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
1 f0(k)
h(u,a − 1)kf (k)(1 + b)
¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
.








¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
1 gp a+b
1−ua=b










¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
1 gph(u,a + b)
h(u,a − 1)kg p k
(1+b)h(u,a−1)h(u,a+b)
h(u,a−1)−h(u,a+b)
¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
= −









¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
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h(u,a − 1)h(u,a + b)
h(u,a − 1) − h(u,a + b)
pk
u2 (1 − ua−1)
2 {1+b − [h(u,a − 1) − h(u,a + b)]}.




















1+b − [h(u,a − 1) − h(u,a + b)]
1+b




1+b − [h(u,a − 1) − h(u,a + b)]
1+b
σ − [h(u,a − 1) − h(u,a + b)]
,
which is equation (16) in the text.
As we show in Section A.5 (Property 2), h is positive and 1+b
σ −[h(u,a−1)−h(u,a+b)] > 0
for 0 ≤ σ ≤ 2. Consequently, if 0 ≤ σ ≤ 2,
pdk
kdp < 0.
59A.5 Some properties of h
To complete the proof of existence in Section A.4 we show now the following result.















































This is negative because we are assuming p<P(σ) and σ − 1 < 0.




























































h(u,a − 1) = ∞
60and
(b) lim














a+b¢σ−1 (a − 1)ua−1
1 − ua−1 = ∞ if 0 ≤ σ < 1.
(b) follows because
lim





























(a − 1)(1 − ua+b) − (a + b)(1− ua−1)
(1 − ua−1)(1− ua+b)
¸
.
Since the numerator and denominator of the above tend to zero as u → 1,w ea p p l y




−(a − 1)(a + b)ua+b−1 +( a + b)(a − 1)ua−2





(a − 1)(a + b)(u1+b − 1)
(a − 1)(1 − ua+b)+( a + b)u1+b (1 − ua−1)
¸
,
where the last equality follows after we divide numerator and denominator by ua−2.C o n t i n -




(a − 1)(a + b)(1+b)ub
(a − 1)(a + b)ua+b−1 +( a − 1)(a + b)u1+bua−2 − (a + b)(1+b)ub (1 − ua−1)
¸
= −
(a − 1)(a + b)(1+b)





Combining the last equality with (72) gives the desired result.
61The next result is central for the analysis of the SOC and the comparative statics results.







h(u,a) < 0. (73)












ua(1 − ua +l nua)
(1 − ua)2 < 0.
Let us call
h1(x) ≡
x(1 − x +l nx)
(1 − x)2 .
Note that









2 − 2x +( 1+x)lnx
(1 − x)3 < 0 for 0 <x<1,
or equivalently if
h2(x) ≡ 2 − 2x +( 1+x)lnx<0.
Given that h2(0) = −∞ and that h2(1) = 0 it suﬃces to show that h0



















where the inequality follows from the the concavity of ln and from its ﬁrst order Taylor
expansion around x =1 .
The next result completes the proof of uniqueness in Section A.4.2 and is used in various
comparative statics exercises.
62Corollary from Property 2: (73) implies
0 <h(u,x) − h(u,x + b +1 )<
1+b
2
for any x ≥ 0 and any 0 ≤ σ ≤ 2. This implies




h(u,a − 1) − h(u,a + b) <
1+b
σ
for any 0 ≤ σ ≤ 2.
The next result computes the eﬀective depreciation rate when T →∞or equivalently
when u → 0.
Property 3: limu→0 δEF = g + δ + n.








r − (g + n)
·
D(g + δ + n,T) − e−(g+δ)TD(n,T)














a − (1 + c)
"
1−u1+b+c
1+b+c − u1+b 1−uc
c
1−ua+b





>From this we get
g
−1δEF =[ a − (1 + c)]
1−ua+b
a+b − u1+b 1−ua−1
a−1
1−u1+b+c




a+b − u1+b 1−ua−1
a−1
i
=[ a − (1 + c)]
1−ua+b









63Taking the limit as u → 0,i tf o l l o w st h a t
g
−1 lim






=[ a − (1 + c)]
1+b + c




u→0δEF = g(1 + b + c)=g + δ + n.
The next result is used to establish the comparative statics properties of Section 6.2.
Property 4: Assume a − 1 >c .T h e n
(i)
h(u,a − 1) − h(u,a + b)
h(u,a + b)
>
h(u,c) − h(u,1+b + c)
h(u,1+b + c)
and (ii)
h(u,c) − h(u,1+b + c) >h(u,a − 1) − h(u,a + b).















Proof: Since a − 1 >c , (i) holds if
h(u,x)
h(u,1+b+x) is increasing in x. So let’s compute the
partial derivative of
h(u,x)














1 − ux +l nux
1 − ux −
1
1+b + x








1 − ux +l nux
(1 − ux)lnux −















1+b+x > 0 for u ∈ (0,1) and b,x > 0.
(ii) Likewise (ii) holds if h(u,x) − h(u,x +1+b) is decreasing in x. So let’s compute
the partial derivative of h(u,x) − h(u,x +1+b) with respect to x.
∂
∂x
[h(u,x) − h(u,x +1+b)] =




1 − u1+b+x +l nu1+b+x¢
(1 − u1+b+x)
2 .
This last term is negative by the proof of Property 2 (see the proof that h0
1 < 0).
(iii) Since v<1, u
v >uso it suﬃces to show that
h(u,a+b)























1 − ua+b −
a − 1
1 − ua−1.










65A.6 Comparative statics results of national income statistics with
respect to p
A.6.1 per capita income





1 − [u(p)]cf (k(p)).
where u(p) and k(p) is the solution to (9) and c ≡ n
g.





















= −[h(u,c) − h(u,1+b + c)]
×





σ − [h(u,a − 1) − h(u,a + b)]
−




1+b − [h(u,a − 1) − h(u,a + b)]
1+b
σ − [h(u,a − 1) − h(u,a + b)]
.










2 − [h(u,a − 1) − h(u,a + b)] + 1+b
2 − σ−1
σ [h(u,c) − h(u,1+b + c)]
1+b
σ − [h(u,a − 1) − h(u,a + b)]
,
which simpliﬁes to equation (45) in the text. It follows from the corollary to Property 2 in
Section A.5 that the above is negative as long as 0 ≤ σ ≤ 2.
66A.6.2 Comparative Statics of the wage
























= −(1 + b)





σ − [h(u,a − 1) − h(u,a + b)]
−




1+b − [h(u,a − 1) − h(u,a + b)]
1+b
σ − [h(u,a − 1) − h(u,a + b)]
,






h(u,a − 1) − h(u,a + b)
h(u,a + b)
1+b − [h(u,a − 1) − h(u,a + b)] − σ−1
σ (1 + b)
1+b
σ − [h(u,a − 1) − h(u,a + b)]
= −
h(u,a − 1) − h(u,a + b)
h(u,a + b)
,





















where the last equality follows from equations (38) and (39) and the transformation u = e−gT.
67On the other hand, for the neoclassical model we get














Further, for the neoclassical model,
f
































dp is smaller (bigger in absolute value) in our model than in the neoclassical
model.
A.6.3 Comparative Statics of the price proﬁle



















a+b − u1+b 1−ua−1
a−1
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=( 1 + b)
(
h(u,a + b)












































which is equation (48) in the text. This last term is negative by Property 4 (iii) in Section
A.5.
A.6.4 Comparative statics of the wage-income covariance






1+b − [h(u,a − 1) − h(u,a + b)] − σ−1
σ [h(u,c) − h(u,1+b + c)]
1+b
σ − [h(u,a − 1) − h(u,a + b)]
, (75)
which simpliﬁes to equation (51) in the text (see calculations below). To compare the above
with the corresponding term in the neoclassical model note that in that model


































Also, for the neoclassical model




























1+b − [h(u,a − 1) − h(u,a + b)] − σ−1
σ [h(u,c) − h(u,1+b + c)]
1+b − σ[h(u,a − 1) − h(u,a + b)]
= σ
1+b − σ [h(u,a − 1) − h(u,a + b)]
1+b − σ [h(u,a − 1) − h(u,a + b)]
+σ
(σ − 1)[h(u,a − 1) − h(u,a + b)] + 1−σ
σ [h(u,c) − h(u,1+b + c)]
1+b − σ[h(u,a − 1) − h(u,a + b)]
= σ + σ
1 − σ
σ
h(u,c) − h(u,1+b + c) − σ[h(u,a − 1) − h(u,a + b)]
1+b − σ [h(u,a − 1) − h(u,a + b)]
.





= σ +( 1− σ)
h(u,c) − h(u,1+b + c) − σ[h(u,a − 1) − h(u,a + b)]
1+b − σ [h(u,a − 1) − h(u,a + b)]
> σ.
If we divide numerator and denominator of the second term on the right hand side by σ we
get equation (51).
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